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Abstract
We consider the problem of predicting winners in elections, for the case where we
are given complete knowledge about all possible candidates, all possible voters (together
with their preferences), but where it is uncertain either which candidates exactly reg-
ister for the election or which voters cast their votes. Under reasonable assumptions,
our problems reduce to counting variants of election control problems. We either give
polynomial-time algorithms or prove #P-completeness results for counting variants of
control by adding/deleting candidates/voters for Plurality, k-Approval, Approval, Con-
dorcet, and Maximin voting rules. We consider both the general case, where voters’
preferences are unrestricted, and the case where voters’ preferences are single-peaked.
1 Introduction
Predicting election winners is always an exciting activity: Who will be the new president?
Will the company merge with another one? Will taxes be higher or lower? The goal of
this paper is to establish the computational complexity of a family of problems modeling a
certain type of winner-prediction problems.
Naturally, predicting winners is a hard task, full of uncertainties. For example, we
typically are not sure which voters will eventually cast their votes or, sometimes, even
which candidates will participate in the election (consider, e.g., a candidate withdrawing
due to personal reasons). Further, typically we do not have complete knowledge regarding
each voters’ preferences. Nonetheless, elections are in everyday use both among humans
(consider, e.g., political elections, elections among companies’ shareholders, various polls
on the Internet and social media, or even sport events, where judges “vote” on who is the
best competitor) and among software agents (see, e.g., election applications for planning in
multiagent systems [14], for recommendation systems [25, 36, 48], for web-search [12], or
∗An early version of this paper was presented at the Twenty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial In-
telligence (AAAI-12), July 22–26, 2012, in Toronto, Canada and at IJCAI Workshop on Social Choice and
Artificial Intelligence, July 16, 2011, in Barcelona.
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natural language processing [32]) and, thus, the problem of predicting election winners is
far too important to be abandoned simply because it is difficult.
In this paper, we focus on a variant of the winner-prediction problem where we have com-
plete knowledge regarding all possible candidates and all eligible voters (including knowledge
of their preferences1), but we are uncertain as to which candidates and which voters turn
up for the actual election (see Section 5 for other approaches to the problem). However,
modelling uncertainty regarding both the candidate set and the voter collection on one hand
almost immediately leads to computationally hard problems for typical election systems, and
on the other hand does not seem to be as well motivated as focusing on each of these sets
separately. Thus, we consider the following two settings:
1. The set of candidates is fixed, but for each possible subset of voters we are given a
probability that exactly these voters show up for the vote.
2. The set of voters is fixed, but for each possible subset of candidates we are given a
probability that exactly these candidates register for the election.
The former setting, in particular, corresponds to political elections (e.g., to presidential
elections), where the candidate set is typically fixed well in advance due to election rules, the
set of all possible voters (i.e., the set of all citizens eligible to vote) is known, but it is not clear
as to which citizens choose to cast their votes. The latter setting may occur, for example,
if one considers software agents voting on a joint plan [14]. The set of agents participating
in the election is typically fixed, but various variants of the plan can be put forward or
dismissed dynamically. In either case, our goal is to compute each candidate’s probability
of victory. However, our task would very quickly become computationally prohibitive (or,
difficult to represent on a computer) if we allowed arbitrary probability distributions. Thus,
we have to choose some restriction on the distributions we consider. Let us consider the
following example.
Let the set C of candidates participating in the election be fixed (e.g., because the
election rules force all candidates to register well in advance). We know that some set V
of voters will certainly vote (e.g., because they have already voted and this information is
public2). The set of voters who have not decided to vote yet is W . From some source (e.g.,
from prior experience) we have a probability distribution P on the number of voters from
W that will participate in the election (we assume that each equal-sized subset from W is
equally likely to joint the election; we have no prior knowledge as to which eligible voters
are more likely to vote). That is, for each i, 0 ≤ i ≤ ‖W‖, by P (i) we denote the probability
that exactly i voters from W join the election (we assume that P (i) is easily computable).
By Q(i) we denote the probability that a certain designated candidate p wins provided that
exactly i, randomly chosen, voters from W participate in the election. The probability that
1Note that while full-knowledge assumption regarding voters’ preferences might seem very unrealistic, it
is standard within computational social choice literature, and in our case can often be justified (e.g., election
polls can provide a good approximation of such knowledge).
2Naturally, in typical political elections such information would not be public and we would have to rely
on polls. On the other hand, in multiagent systems there can be cases where votes are public.
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p wins is given by:
P (0)Q(0) + P (1)Q(1) + · · ·P (‖W‖)Q(‖W‖).
We use this formula to compute the probability of each candidate’s victory, which gives
some idea as to who is the likely winner of the election.
To compute Q(i), we have to compute for how many subsets W ′ of W of size exactly i
candidate p wins after adding the voters from W ′ to the election, and divide it by
(‖W‖
i
)
.
That is, computing Q(i) boils down to solving a counting variant of control by adding voters
problem. In the decision variant of this control problem, introduced by Bartholdi, Tovey,
and Trick [3], we are given an election where some voters have already registered to vote,
some are not-yet-registered, and we ask if it is possible to add some number of these not-
yet-registered voters (but no more than a given limit) to ensure that a designated candidate
wins. In the counting variant, studied first in this paper, we ask how many ways are there
to add such a group of voters.
One can do reasoning analogous to the one presented above for the case of control
by deleting voters and for the case of control by adding/deleting candidates. That is, our
winner prediction problems, in essence, reduce to solving counting variants of election control
problems. Our goal in this paper is, thus, to study the computational complexity of these
counting control problems.
Computational study of election control was initiated by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [3],
and in recent years was continued by a number of researchers (we discuss related work in
Section 5; we also point the reader to the survey of Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemas-
paandra [18] for a more detailed discussion of the complexity of election control). However,
our paper is the first one to study counting variants of control (though, as we discuss in
Section 5, the papers of Walsh and Xia [52] and of Bachrach, Betzler, and Faliszewski [1]
are very close in spirit).
It is well-known that election control problems tend to have fairly high worst-case com-
plexity. Indeed, we are not aware of a single practical voting rule for which the decision
variants of the four most typical election control problems (the problems of adding/deleting
candidates/voters) are all polynomial-time solvable. Naturally, when a decision variant of
a counting problem is NP-hard, then we cannot hope that its counting variant would be
polynomial-time solvable. In effect, from the technical perspective, our research can be seen
as answering the following question: For which voting rules and for which control types is
the counting variant of the control problem no harder than its decision variant? From the
practical perspective, it is, nonetheless, more important to simply have effective algorithms.
To this end, we follow Faliszewski et al. [23] and in addition to the general setting where
each voter can cast any possible vote, we study the single-peaked case, where the voting is
restricted to a certain class of votes viewed as “reasonable” (intuitively, in the single-peaked
case we assume that the candidates are located on a one-dimensional spectrum of possible
opinions, each voter has some favorite opinion on this spectrum, and the voters form their
preferences based on candidates’ distances from their favorite position). Single-peaked pref-
erences, introduced by Black [7] over 50 years ago, are often viewed as a natural (if somewhat
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simplified due to its one-dimensional nature) model of how realistic votes might look like
(however, whenever one makes a statement of this form, one should keep in mind the results
of Sui, Francois-Nienaber, and Boutilier [49]). It turns out that for the sinlge-peaked case,
we obtain polynomial-time algorithms for counting variants of all our control problems and
all the rules that we consider (except for the Approval rule, for which we have no results in
this case).
We mention that our model of winner prediction, based on counting variants of control,
is similar to, though more general than, the model where we assume that each voter casts
his or her vote with some probability p (universal for all the voters). We can simulate this
scenario in our model by providing an appropriate function P . Specifically, if there are n
voters and the probability that each particular voter v casts his or her vote is p, then the
probability that exactly i voters vote is given by the binomial distribution:
P (i) =
(
n
i
)
pi(1− p)n−i.
On the other hand, our model does not capture the situation where each voter v has a
possibly different probability pv of casting a vote. We believe that this latter model deserves
study as well, but we do not focus on it in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. First, in Section 2, we formally define elections and
provide brief background on complexity theory (focusing on counting problems). Then, in
Section 3, we define counting variants of election control problems and prove some of their
general properties. Our main results are in Section 4. There we study the complexity of
Plurality, k-Approval, Appoval, Condorcet rule, and Maximin rule. For each of the rules,
we consider the unrestricted case and, if we obtain a hardness result, we consider the single-
peaked case (except for Approval, for which we were not able to obtain results for the
single-peaked case). Finally, we discuss related work in Section 5 and bring together our
conclusions and discuss future work in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
Elections. An election E is a pair (C, V ) such that C is a finite set of candidates and V
is a finite collection of voters. We typically use m to denote the number of candidates and
n to denote the number of voters. Each voter has a preference order in which he or she
ranks candidates, from the most desirable one to the most despised one. For example, if
C = {a, b, c} and a voter likes b most and a least, then this voter would have preference order
b > c > a. (However, under Approval voting, instead of ranking the candidates each voter
simply indicates which candidates he or she approves of.) We sometimes use the following
notation. Let A be some subset of the candidate set. Putting A in a preference order means
listing members of A in lexicographic order and putting
←−
A in a preference order means listing
members of A in the reverse of the lexicographic order. For example, if C = {a, b, c, d} then
a > C − {a, b} > d means a > c > d > b and a >
←−−−−−−−
C − {a, b} > d means a > d > c > b.
Given an election E = (C, V ), we write NE(c, c′) to denote the number of voters in V that
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prefer c to c′. The function NE is sometimes referred to as the weighted majority graph of
election E.
In general, given a candidate set C, the voters are free to report any preference order
over C (we refer to this setting as the unrestricted case). However, it is often more realistic
to assume some restriction on the domain of possible votes (for example, in real-life political
elections we do not expect to see many voters who rank the extreme left-wing candidate
first, then the extreme right-wing candidate, and so on, in an interleaving fashion). Thus,
in addition to the unrestricted case, we also study the case of single-peaeked preferences
of Black [7] (this domain restriction is quite popular in the computational social choice
literature, and was already studied, e.g., by Conitzer [11], Walsh [51], Faliszewski et al. [23],
and others; see Section 5).
Definition 2.1. Let C be a set of candidates and let L be a linear order over C (we refer
to L as the societal axis). We say that a preference order > (over C) is single-peaked with
respect to L if for each three candidate a, b, c ∈ C, it holds that
(a L b L c ∨ c L b L a) =⇒ (a > b =⇒ b > c)
An election E = (C, V ) is single-peaked with respect to L if each vote in V is single-peaked
with respect to L. An election E = (C, V ) is single-peaked if there is a societal axis L such
that E is single-peaked with respect to L.
There are polynomial-time algorithms that given an election E verify if it is single-peaked
and, if so, provide the appropriate societal axis witnessing this fact [4, 17, 2]. Thus, following
Walsh [51], whenever we consider problems about single-peaked elections, we assume that
we are given appropriate societal axis as part of the input (if it were not provided, we could
always compute it.)
Voting Systems. A voting system (a voting rule) is a rule which specifies how election
winners are determined. We allow an election to have more than one winner, or even to
not have winners at all. In practice, tie-breaking rules are used, but here we disregard this
issue by simply using the unique winner model (see Definition 3.1). However, we point the
reader to [42, 41, 43] for a discussion regarding the influence of tie-breaking for the case of
election manipulation problems (see [18, 24, 9] for overviews of the manipulation problem
specifically and computational aspects of voting generally).
We consider the following voting rules (in the description below we assume that E =
(C, V ) is an election with m candidates and n voters):
Plurality. Under Plurality, each candidate receives a point for each vote where this candi-
date is ranked first. The candidates with most points win.
k-Approval. For each candidate c ∈ C, we define c’s k-Approval score, scorekE(c), to be
the number of voters in V that rank c among the top k candidates; the candidates
with highest scores win. Note that Plurality is, in effect, a nickname for 1-Approval.
(We mention that k-Veto means (m− k)-Approval, though we do not study k-Veto in
this paper).
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Approval. Under Approval (without the qualifying “k-”), the score of a candidate c ∈ C,
score
a
E(c), is the number of voters that approve of c (recall that under Approval the
voters do not cast preference orders but 0/1 approval vectors, where for each candidate
they indicate if they approve of this candidate or not). Again, the candidates with
highest scores win. (Note that the notion of single-peaked elections that we have
provided as Definition 2.1 does not apply to preferences specified as approval vectors;
Faliszewski et al. [23] have provided a natural variant of single-peakedness for approval
vectors, but since we did not obtain results for this case, we omitted this definition.)
Condorcet. A candidate c is a Condorcet winner exactly if NE(c, c′) > NE(c′, c) for each
c′ ∈ C−{c}. A candidate c is a weak Condorcet winner exactly if NE(c, c′) ≥ NE(c′, c)
for each c′ ∈ C−{c}. Note that if an election has a Condorcet winner, then this winner
is unique (though, an election may have several weak Condorcet winners).3 We recall
the classic result that if the voters are single-peaked then the election always has
(weak) Condorcet winner(s) (if the number of voters is odd, then the election has a
unique Condorcet winner).
Maximin. Maximin rule is defined as follows. The score of a candidate c is defined as
score
m
E (c) = mind∈C−{c}NE(c, d). The candidates with highest Maximin score are
Maximin winners.
Maximin is an example of a so-called Condorcet-consistent rule. A rule R is Condorcet-
consistent if the following holds: If E is an election with (weak) Condorcet winner(s), then
the R-winners of E are exactly these (weak) Condorcet winner(s). We also considered study-
ing the Copeland rule (see, e.g., the work of Faliszewski et al. [22] regarding the complexity of
control for the Copeland rule), but for this rule all relevant types of control are NP-complete
and, so, at best we would obtain #P-completeness results based on simple generalizations
of proofs from the literature. Nonetheless, since Copeland’s rule is Condorcet-consistent,
results for the single-peaked case are valid for it.
Notation for Graphs. We assume familiarity with basic concepts of graph theory. Given
an undirected graph G, by V (G) we mean its set of vertices, and by E(G) we mean its set
of edges.4 Whenever we discuss a bipartite graph G, we assume that V (G) is partitioned
into two subsets, X and Y , such that each edge connects some vertex from X with some
vertex from Y . We write X(G) to denote X, and Y (G) to denote Y .
Computational Complexity. We assume that the reader is familiar with standard no-
tions of computational complexity theory, as presented, for example, in the textbook of
3We mention that sometimes Condorcet’s rule is not considered a voting rule (but, for example, a consen-
sus notion [39]) because there are elections for which there are no Condorcet winners. However, Condorcet’s
rule has been traditionally studied in the context of election control, and–thus—we study it to (a) enable
comparison with other papers, and (b) because for single-peaked elections the results for Condorcet rule
translate to all Condorcet-consistent rules.
4We use this slightly nonstandard notation to be able to also use symbols V and E to denote voter
collections and elections.
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Papadimitriou [44], but we briefly review notions regarding the complexity theory of count-
ing problems. Let A be some computational problem where for each instance I we ask if
there exists some mathematical object satisfying a given condition. In the counting vari-
ant of A, denoted #A, for each instance I we ask for the number—denoted #A(I)—of the
objects that satisfy the condition. For example, consider the following problem.
Definition 2.2. An instance of X3C is a pair (B,S), where B = {b1, . . . , b3k} and S =
{S1, . . . , Sn} is a family of 3-element subsets of B. In X3C we ask if it is possible to find
exactly k sets in S whose union is exactly B. In #X3C we ask how many k-element subsets
of S have B as their union.
The class of counting variants of NP-problems is called #P and the class of functions
computable in polynomial time is called FP. To reduce counting problems to each other,
we will use one of the following reducibility notions.
Definition 2.3. Let #A and #B be two counting problems.
1. We say that #A Turing reduces to #B if there exists an algorithm that solves #A in
polynomial time given oracle access to #B (i.e., given the ability to solve #B instances
in unit time).
2. We say that #A metric reduces to #B if there exist two polynomial-time computable
functions, f and g, such that for each instance I of #A it holds that (1) f(I) is an
instance of #B, and (2) #A(I) = g(I,#B(f(I))).
3. We say that #A parsimoniously reduces to #B if #A metric reduces to #B via func-
tions f and g such that for each instance I and each integer k, g(I, k) = k (i.e., there
is a polynomial-time computable function f such that for each instance I of #A, we
have #A(I) = #B(f(I))).
It is well-known that these reducibility notions are transitive. For a given reducibility
notion R, we say that a problem is #P-R-complete if it belongs to #P and every #P-problem
R reduces to it. For example, #X3C is #P-parsimonious-complete [29]. Throughout this
paper we will write #P-complete to mean #P-parsimonious-complete. Turing reductions
were used, e.g., by Valiant [50] to show #P-hardness of computing a permanent of a 0/1
matrix. As a result, he also showed #P-Turing-hardness of the following problem.
Definition 2.4. In #PerfectMatching we are given a bipartite graph G =
(G(X), G(Y ), G(E)) with ‖G(X)‖ = ‖G(Y )‖ and we ask how many perfect matchings does
G have.
Zankó [55] improved upon this result by showing that #PerfectMatching is #P-many-
one-complete (“many-one” is yet another reducibility type, more general than parsimonious
reductions but less general than metric reductions). From our perspective, it suffices that,
in effect, #PerfectMatching is #P-metric-complete. Metric reductions were introduced by
Krentel [31], and parsimonious reductions were defined by Simon [47].
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3 Counting Variants of Control Problems
In this section we formally define counting variants of election control problems and show
some interconnections between some of them. We are interested in control by adding candi-
dates (AC), control by deleting candidates (DC), control by adding voters (AV), and control
by deleting voters (DV). For each of these problems, we consider its constructive variant
(CC) and its destructive variant (DC).
Definition 3.1. Let R be a voting system. In each of the counting variants of constructive
control problems we are given a candidate set C, a voter collection V , a nonnegative integer
k, and a designated candidate p ∈ C. In constructive control by adding voters we are
additionally given a collection W of unregistered voters, and in constructive control by adding
candidates we are additionally given a set A of unregistered candidates. In these problems
we ask for the following quantities:
1. In control by adding voters (R-#CCAV), we ask how many sets W ′, W ′ ⊆ W , are
there such that p is the unique winner of R-election (C, V ∪W ′), where ‖W ′‖ ≤ k.
2. In control by deleting voters (R-#CCDV), we ask how many sets V ′, V ′ ⊆ V are there
such that p is the unique winner of R-election (C, V − V ′), where ‖V ′‖ ≤ k.
3. In control by adding candidates (R-#CCAC), we ask how many sets A′, A′ ⊆ A, are
there such that p is the unique winner of R-election (C ∪A′, V ), where ‖A′‖ ≤ k.
4. In control by deleting candidates (R-#CCDC), we ask how many sets C ′, C ′ ⊆ C, are
there such that p is the unique winner of R-election (C −C ′, V ), where ‖C ′‖ ≤ k and
p 6∈ C ′.
Destructive variants are defined identically, except that we ask for the number of settings
where the designated candidate is not the unique winner.
(To obtain decision variants of the above problems, simply change the question from asking
for a particular quantity to asking if that quantity is greater than zero. We mention that in
the literature researchers often study both the unique-winner model—as we do here—and
the nonunique-winner model, where it suffices to be one of the winners. For the rules that
we study, results for both models are the same.)
The above problems are interesting for several reasons. First, as described in the in-
troduction, we believe that they are useful as models for various scenarios pertaining to
predicting election winners. Second, they are counting variants of the well-studied control
problems [3, 28]. Third, they expose intuitive connections between various types of control.
In particular, we have the following results linking the complexity of destructive variants
with that of the constructive ones, and linking the complexity of the “deleting” variants with
that of the “adding” variants.
Theorem 3.2. Let R be a voting system, let #C be one of R-#CCAC, R-#CCDC, R-
#CCAV, R-#CCDV, and let #D be the destructive variant of #C. Then, #C metric reduces
to #D and #D metric reduces to #C.
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Proof. We give a metric reduction from #C to #D. Let I be an instance of #C, where the
goal is to make some candidate p the unique winner. We define f(I) to be an instance of
#D that is identical to I, except that the goal is to ensure that p is not the unique winner.
Let sI be the total number of control actions allowed in I5 (and, naturally, also the total
number of control actions allowed in f(I)). It is easy to see that sI is polynomial-time
computable and that the number of solutions for I is exactly sI − #D(f(I)). Thus, we
define g(I,#D(f(I))) = sI −#D(f(I)). We see that the reduction is polynomial-time and
correct. The same argument shows that #D metric reduces to #C.
Theorem 3.3. Let R be a voting system, then R-#CCDV Turing reduces to R-#CCAV
and R-#CCDC Turing reduces to R-#CCAC.
Proof. Let us fix a voting system R. The proofs that R-#CCDV Turing reduces to R-
#CCAV and that R-#CCDC Turing-reduces to R-#CCAV are very similar and thus we
discuss them jointly. Let I = (C, V, p, k) be an input instance of R-#CCDV (of R-CCDC),
where C is the candidate set, V is the collection of voters, p is the designated candidate, and
k is the upper bound on the number of voters that can be removed. We define the following
transformations of I:
1. For the case of R-#CCDV, for each nonnegative integer g, g ≤ ‖V ‖, let Jg be an
instance of R-#CCAV, where the candidate set is C, the set of registered voters is
empty, the collection of unregistered voters is V , the designated candidate is p, and
the bound on the number of voters that can be added is g, That is, Jg = (C, ∅, V, p, g).
2. For the case of R-#CCDC, for each nonnegative integer g, g ≤ ‖C‖ − 1, let Jg
be an instance of R-#CCAC, where the candidate set is {p}, the set of registered
voters is V , the set of unregistered candidates is C − {p}, the designated candidate
is p, and the bound on the number of candidates that can be added is g. That is,
Jg = ({p}, C − {p}, V, p, g).
To complete the reduction, it suffices to note that for the case of R-#CCDV it holds that:
R-#CCDV(I) =
{
R-#CCAV(J‖V ‖) , if k ≥ ‖V ‖
R-#CCAV(J‖V ‖)−R-#CCAV(J‖V ‖−k−1) , if 0 ≤ k < ‖V ‖
and for the case of R-#CCDC it holds that:
R-#CCDC(I) =
{
R-#CCAC(J‖C‖−1) , if k ≥ ‖C‖ − 1
R-#CCAC(J‖C‖−1)−R-#CCAC(J‖C‖−k−2) , if 0 ≤ k < ‖C‖ − 1
These expressions define a natural algorithm for solving R-#CCDV (R-#CCDC) given at
most two calls to an R-#CCAV (an R-#CCAC) oracle. It is clear that this Turing reduction
runs in polynomial time.
5For example, if #C was #CCDV and I = (C, V, p, k), then sI would be the number of up-to-size-k
subsets of V (i.e., the number of subsets of voters that can be deleted from V ).
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Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 are very useful and, in particular, we obtain all of our destructive-
case hardness results via Theorem 3.2, and all our “deleting”-case easiness results using
Theorem 3.3.
Obtaining results similar to Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 for the decision variants of control
problems is more difficult. Nonetheless, recently several researchers have made some progress
on this front. In particular, Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Menton [27] have shown
that control by partition of candidates and control by runoff partition of candidates (two
types of control not discussed in this paper) are equivalent in terms of their computational
complexity. Focusing on particular classes of voting rules, for the case of k-Approval and
k-Veto, Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [20] have shown that control by
deleting voters reduces to control by adding voters, and Miąsko [40] achieved the same for
the case of voting rules based on the weighted majority graphs (e.g., for Borda, Condorcet,
Maximin, and Copeland).6
4 Results
We now present our complexity results regarding counting variants of election control prob-
lems. We consider two cases: the unrestricted case, where the voters can have any arbitrary
preference orders, and the single-peaked case, where voters’ preference orders are single-
peaked with respect to a given societal axis. We summarize our results in Table 1. For
comparison, in Table 2 we quote results for the decision variants of the respective control
problems.
Let us consider the unrestricted case first. Not surprisingly, for each of our control
problems whose decision variant is NP-complete, the counting variant is #P-complete for
some reducibility type. However, interestingly, we have also found examples of election
systems and control types where the decision variant is easy, but the counting variant is hard.
For example, for 2-Approval we have that all decision variants of voter control problems are
in P [33, 20], yet all their counting variants are #P-Turing-complete. Similarly, for Maximin
all decision variants of candidate control (except constructive control by adding candidates)
are in P [19], yet their counting variants are #P-Turing-complete (or are complete for #P
through even less demanding reducibility types).
The situation for the single-peaked case is quite interesting as well. While we found
polynomial-time algorithms for all of our control problems for Plurality, k-Approval, and all
Condorcet-consistent rules, we did not obtain results for voter control under Approval (can-
didate control for Approval is easy even in the unrestricted case). Decision variants of voter
control are NP-complete for Approval in the unrestricted case, but—very interestingly—are
in P for the single-peaked case. However, the algorithm for the single-peaked case is a clever
greedy approach that seems to be very difficult to adapt to the counting case. Further, as
opposed to the k-Approval case, for voter control under Approval, there does not seem to be
6Miąsko’s master’s thesis gives this result for the case of Borda and destructive control only, but it is
clear that the proof technique adapts to constructive control and that it applies to all voting rules based on
weighted majority graphs.
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(a) The Unrestricted Case
Problem Plurality k-Approval, k ≥ 2 Approval Condorcet Maximin
#CCAC #P-com. #P-com. – – #P-com.
#DCAC #P-metric-com. #P-metric-com. FP FP #P-metric-com.
#CCDC #P-com. #P-com. FP FP #P-Turing-com.
#DCDC #P-metric-com. #P-metric-com. – – #P-Turing-com.
#CCAV FP #P-Turing-com. #P-com. #P-com. #P-com.
#DCAV FP #P-Turing-com. #P-metric-com. #P-metric-com. #P-metric-com.
#CCDV FP #P-metric-com. #P-com. #P-com. #P-com.
#DCDV FP #P-metric-com. #P-metric-com. #P-metric-com. #P-metric-com.
(b) The Single-Peaked Case
Problem Plurality k-Approval, k ≥ 2 Approval Condorcet-Consistent
(e.g., Maximin)
#CCAC FP FP – –
#DCAC FP FP FP FP
#CCDC FP FP FP FP
#DCDC FP FP – –
#CCAV FP FP ? FP
#DCAV FP FP ? FP
#CCDV FP FP ? FP
#DCDV FP FP ? FP
Table 1: The complexity of counting variants of control problems for (a) the unrestricted
case, and for (b) the single-peaked case. A dash in an entry means that the given system
is immune to the type of control in question (i.e., it is impossible to achieve the desired
effect by the action this control problem allows; technically this means the answer to the
counting question is always 0). Immunity results were established by Bartholdi, Tovey,
and Trick (1989) for the constructive cases, and by Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and
Rothe (2007) for the destructive cases.
a natural dynamic-programming-based approach. Naturally, we also tried to find a hardness
proof, but we failed at that as well because the problem seems to have quite a rich structure.
(However, see the work of Miąsko [40] for the case of priced control under Approval with
single-peaked preferences.)
In the following sections we give proofs for our results and provide some more detailed
discussion regarding particular voting rules.
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(a) The Unrestricted Case
Problem Plurality 2-Approval 3-Approval k-Approval, k ≥ 4 Approval Condorcet Maximin
CCAC NP-com. NP-com. NP-com. NP-com. – – NP-com.
DCAC NP-com. NP-com. NP-com. NP-com. P P P
CCDC NP-com. NP-com. NP-com. NP-com. P P P
DCDC NP-com. NP-com. NP-com. NP-com. – – P
CCAV P P P NP-com. NP-com. NP-com. NP-com.
DCAV P P P NP-com. P P NP-com.
CCDV P P NP-com. NP-com. NP-com. NP-com. NP-com.
DCDV P P P NP-com. P P NP-com.
(b) The Single-Peaked Case
Problem Plurality k-Approval, k ≥ 2 Approval Condorcet-Consistent
(e.g., Maximin)
CCAC P P – –
DCAC P P P P
CCDC P P P P
DCDC P P – –
CCAV P P P P
DCAV P P P P
CCDV P P P P
DCDV P P P P
Table 2: The complexity of decision variants of control problems for (a) the unrestricted
case, and for (b) the single-peaked case. A dash in an entry means that the given system is
immune to the type of control in question. For the unrestricted case, we have the following:
The results for Plurality are due to Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [3] and Hemaspaandra,
Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [28], the results regarding k-Approval are due to Lin [33] (see
also [13, 20]), the results regarding Approval are due to Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and
Rothe [28], and the results regarding Maximin are due to Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and
Hemaspaandra [19]. For the single-peaked case, we inherit polynomial-time algorithms from
the unrestricted case. The remaining results (except those for Condorcet-consistent rules)
are due to Faliszewski et al. [23], and the remaining results regarding Condorcet-consistent
rules are due to [8].
4.1 Plurality Voting
Under plurality voting, counting variants of both control by adding voters and control by
deleting voters are in FP even for the unrestricted case. Our algorithms are based on
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dynamic programming and applications of Theorems 3.2 and 3.3.
Theorem 4.1. Plurality-#CCAV, Plurality-#DCAV, Plurality-#CCDV, and Plurality-
#DCDV are in FP, even in the unrestricted case.
Proof. We give the proof for Plurality-#CCAV only. The result for Plurality-#CCDV fol-
lows by applying Theorem 3.3, and the destructive cases follows by applying Theorem 3.2.
Let I = (C, V,W, p, k) be an input instance of Plurality-#CCAV, where C =
{p, c1, . . . , cm−1} is the candidate set, V is the set of registered voters, W is the set of
unregistered voters, p is the designated candidate, and k is the upper bound on the number
of voters that can be added. We now describe a polynomial-time algorithm that computes
the number of solutions for I.
Let Ap be the set of voters from W that rank p first. Similarly, for each ci ∈ C, let Aci
be the set of voters fromW that rank ci first. We also define count(C, V,W, p, k, j) to be the
number of sets W ′ ⊆ W −Ap such that (1) ‖W ′‖ ≤ k − j, and (2) in election (C, V ∪W ′)
each candidate ci ∈ C, 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, has score at most score
p
(C,V )(p) + j − 1.
Our algorithm works as follows. First, we compute k0, the minimum number of voters
from Ap that need to be added to V to ensure that p has plurality score higher than any
other candidate (provided no other voters are added). Clearly, if p already is the unique
winner of (C, V ) then k0 is 0, and otherwise k0 is maxci∈C(score
p
(C,V )(ci)−score
p
(C,V )(p)+1).
Then, for each j, k0 ≤ j ≤ min(k, ‖Ap‖), we compute the number of sets W ′, W ′ ⊆ W ,
such that W ′ contains exactly j voters from Ap, at most k − j voters from W −Ap, and p
is the unique winner of (C, V ∪W ′). It is easy to verify that for a given j, there is exactly
h(j) =
(‖Ap‖
j
)
· count(C, V,W, p, k, j) such sets. Our algorithm returns
∑min(k,‖Ap‖)
j=k0
h(j).
The reader can easily verify that this indeed is the correct answer. To complete the proof it
suffices to show a polynomial-time algorithm for computing count(C, V,W, p, k, j).
Let us fix j, k0 ≤ j ≤ min(k, ‖Ap‖). We now show how to compute count(C, V,W, p, k, j).
Our goal is to count the number of ways in which we can add at most k − j voters from
W − Ap so that no candidate ci ∈ C has score higher than score
p
(C,V )(p) + j − 1. For each
candidate ci ∈ C, we can add at most li = min
(
‖Aci‖, j+ score
p
(C,V )(p)− score
p
(C,V )(ci)− 1
)
voters from Aci ; otherwise ci’s score would exceed score
p
(C,V )(p) + j − 1.
For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, and each t, 0 ≤ t ≤ k − j, let at,i be the number of sets
W ′ ⊆ Ac1 ∪ Ac2 ∪ · · · ∪ Aci that contain exactly t voters and such that each candidate
c1, c2, . . . , ci has score at most score
p
(C,V )
(p) + j − 1 in the election (C, V ∪W ′). Naturally,
count(C, V,W, p, k, j) =
∑k−j
t=0 at,m−1. It is easy to check that at,i satisfies the following
recursion:
at,i =


∑min(li,t)
s=0
(‖Aci‖
s
)
at−s,i−1, if t > 0, i > 1,
1, if t = 0, i > 1,(‖A1‖
t
)
, if t ≤ ‖Ac1‖, i = 1,
0, if t > ‖Ac1‖, i = 1.
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Thus, for each t, i we can compute at,i using standard dynamic programming techniques
in polynomial time. Thus, count(C, V,W, p, k, j) also is polynomial-time computable. This
completes the proof that Plurality-#CCAV is in FP.
On the other hand, for Plurality voting #CCAC and #CCDC are #P-complete and this
follows from proofs already given in the literature [21].
Theorem 4.2. In the unrestricted case, Plurality-#CCAC and Plurality-#CCDC are #P-
complete.
Proof. Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [21, Theorem 6.4] show that deci-
sion variants of control by adding candidates and control by deleting candidates are NP-
complete.7 Their proofs work by reducing X3C to appropriate control problems in a parsi-
monious way. This means that the same reductions reduce #X3C to the counting variants
of respective control problems.
Now, Corollary 4.3 follows by combining Theorems 4.2 and 3.2.
Corollary 4.3. In the unrestricted case, Plurality-#DCAC and Plurality-#DCDC are #P-
metric-complete.
However, for the single-peaked case, we get easiness results.
Theorem 4.4. For the case of single-peaked profiles, Plurality-#CCAC, Plurality-#CCDC,
Plurality-#DCAC, and Plurality-#DCDC are in FP.
Proof. This result follows from Theorem 4.6 (see the next section) for the case of 1-Approval.
4.2 k-Approval Voting
While k-Approval is in many respects a simple generalization of the Plurality rule, it turns
out that for k ≥ 2, for the unrestricted case, all counting variants of control problems are
intractable for k-Approval. This is quite expected for candidate control because decision
variants of these problems are NP-complete (see the work of Lin [33, 13] and additionally
of Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [20]), but is more intriguing for voter
control (as shown by Lin, for 2-Approval all voter control decision problems are in P, and,
as one can verify, for k-Approval all destructive voter control decision problems are in P). On
the other hand, for the single-peaked case all the counting variants of control are polynomial-
time solvable for k-Approval (however, note that we rely on k being a constant; our results
do not generalize to the case where k is part of the input).
7Naturally, these results are originally due to Bartholid, Tovey, and Trick [3]. However, the proofs
of Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra are more useful in our case, because they work for k-
Approval for each fixed k (which will be useful later), and it is convenient to verify that they give parsimonious
reductions from a #P-complete problem.
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Candidate Control. We start be quickly dealing with candidate control in the unre-
stricted case. For the unrestricted case, as in the case of Plurality, we can use the result of
Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [21].
Theorem 4.5. In the unrestricted case, for each k, k ≥ 2, k-Approval-#CCAC and k-
Approval-#CCDC are #P-complete, and k-Approval-#DCAC and k-Approval-#DCDC are
#P-metric-complete.
Proof. For the constructive variants, the same approach as in the proof of Theorem 4.2
works: The hardness proofs given by Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [21,
Theorem 6.4] apply to the case of k-Approval as well. For the destructive variants, we invoke
Theorem 3.2.
For the single-peaked case, we use a dynamic-programming approach. Our algorithm is
a very extensive generalization of the algorithm for the single-peaked variant of Plurality-
CCAC given by Faliszewski et al. [23]
Theorem 4.6. For the case of single-peaked profiles, for each fixed positive k, k-Approval-
#CCAC, k-Approval-#CCDC, k-Approval-#DCAC, and k-Approval-#DCDC are in FP.
Proof. We give the proof for k-Approval-#CCAC only. The result for k-Approval-#CCDC
follows by applying Theorem 3.3, and the destructive cases follow by applying Theorem 3.2.
We are given a candidate set C, a voter collection V , a designated candidate p ∈ C, a
collection A of unregistered candidates, a positive integer ℓ, and a societal axis L over C∪A.
We show a polynomial time algorithm for determining the number of sets A′, A′ ⊆ A, where
‖A′‖ ≤ ℓ, such that p is the unique k-Approval winner in election (C ∪ A′, V ). We assume
that ‖C ∪A‖ > 4k (otherwise we solve our problem by enumerating all possible solutions).
Intuitively, the idea of our algorithm is as follows: First, we fix two groups of k candidates,
one “to the left” of p (with respect to L) and one “to the right” of p. We will argue that each
choice of such “neighborhood” of p fixes p’s score. Second, with p’s score fixed, we count
how many ways are there to add candidates so that every candidate has fewer points than
p. We sum these values over all choices of p’s “neighborhood.”
Let us introduce some useful notation. For each set X ⊆ C ∪A of candidates we define
before(X) to be the subset of those candidates in C ∪ A that precede each member of X
with respect to L (i.e., before(X) = {d ∈ C ∪A | (∀x ∈ X)[d L x]}). Analogously, we define
after(X) to be the subset of those candidates in C ∪A that succeed all members of X with
respect to L (i.e., after(X) = {d ∈ C ∪ A | (∀x ∈ X)[x L d]}). The next lemma describes
how we can fix candidates’ scores by fixing their “neighborhoods.”
Lemma 4.7. For each set H ⊆ C ∪ A, ‖H‖ = k, each set X ⊆ before(H) and each
candidate c ∈ X, if z is the score of candidate c in k-Approval election (X ∪H,V ), then for
each Y ⊆ after(H) in k-Approval election (X ∪ H ∪ Y, V ) the score of candidate c is z as
well.
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Proof. For a given subset Y ⊆ after(H) and candidate c ∈ X, suppose that the score of
candidate c in k-Approval election (X ∪H ∪ Y, V ) is z′ 6= z. Adding a candidate can never
increase the score of a candidate already present, so we conclude that z′ < z. It means that
there is a voter v ∈ V from which c gains a point in election E1 = (X ∪H,V ) but not in
election E2 = (X ∪H ∪ Y, V ). Thus there is a candidate c′ ∈ Y that receives a point from
v. Since c is among v’s top k most preferred candidates across X ∪H and ‖H‖ = k, there
must exist a candidate c′′ ∈ H that is less preferred than c by v. Since v prefers c′ over c,
it must be that v prefers c′ over c′′. However, we know that c L c′′ L c′, because c ∈ X,
c′′ ∈ H and c′ ∈ Y . Since v is single-peaked with respect to L, v cannot prefer both c and
c′ over c′′; a contradiction.
Let BL be the set of the first 2k candidates from C ∪ A (with respect to L) and let
BR be the set of the last 2k candidates from C ∪ A (with respect to L). Without loss of
generality, we assume that BL and BR contain candidates from C only, and that each voter
has a preference order of the form C − (BL ∪ BR) > BL > BR (if this were not the case
then we could add to C two groups of 2k dummy candidates that all the voters rank last,
respecting the above requirement, and that are at the extreme ends of the societal axis L).
Note that by our assumptions p does not belong to BL ∪ BR and for each A′′ ⊆ A it holds
that in election (C ∪A′′, V ) the candidates from BR receive 0 points each.
We say that a set Y ⊆ C ∪ A is well-formed if for each candidate d ∈ C it holds that
d ∈ before(Y )∪Y ∪after(Y ) (in other words, Y is well-formed if it is an interval with respect
to the societal axis L restricted to C ∪ Y ). We define KL to be a collection of subsets of
before({p}) such that if Y ∈ KL then Y ∪ {p} is well-formed and ‖Y ‖ = k. (Intuitively,
KL is the family of sets of candidates that can form the “left part” of p’s neighborhood.)
We define KR analogously, but “to the right of p.” That is, KR is a collection of subsets of
after({p}) such that if Y ∈ KR then {p} ∪ Y is well-formed and ‖Y ‖ = k. Note that there
are at most O(‖C ∪A‖k) sets in each of KL and KR.
Our algorithm proceeds as follows. In a loop, we try each YL ∈ KL and each YR ∈ KR.
For each choice of YL and YR, we set Y = YL∪{p}∪YR to be the neighborhood of p, and we
set ρ to be the k-Approval score of p in election (Y, V ). (If ‖Y ∩ A‖ > ℓ then we drop this
choice of YL and YR because picking this neighborhood requires adding more candidates than
we are allowed to.) We create two new sets, C ′ = C ∪ Y , A′ = A ∩ (before(Y ) ∪ after(Y )),
and an integer ℓ′ = ℓ − ‖Y ∩ A‖. Finally, we compute the number s(Y ) of size-at-most-ℓ′
subsets A′′ of A′ such that in election (C ′ ∪ A′′, V ) each candidate has less than ρ points
(except for p who, by Lemma 4.7, has exactly ρ points). Computing s(Y ) in polynomial
time is a crucial technical part of the algorithm and we describe it below. We sum up all
the values s(Y ) and return them as our output. By Lemma 4.7 it is easy to see that this
strategy is correct.
We now describe how to compute s(Y ) in polynomial time. Let us consider a situation
where we have picked p’s neighborhood Y and computed ρ, C ′, A′, and ℓ′. If ρ = 0 then p
cannot be the unique winner so we assume that ρ > 0. From now on, we assume that C ′
and A′ take the roles of C and A in the definition of a well-formed set.
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For each well-formed set Z = {z1, . . . , z2k} ⊆ C ′ ∪ A′, such that z1 L · · · L z2k, and for
each nonnegative integer s we define:
f(Z, s) = the number of sets A′′ ⊆ (A′∩before(Z)) such that ‖A′′‖ ≤ s and in election
(Z∪A′′∪ (C ′∩before(Z))) each candidate in {z1, . . . , zk}∪A′′∪ (C ′∩before(Z)) other
than p (if p is included in this set) has fewer than ρ points.8
It is easy to see that s(Y ) is simply f(BR, ℓ′) (recall that BR is the set of “right-hand side”
dummy candidates, who have score 0 in every election). For each Z and s, we can compute
f(Z, s) using dynamic programming. To provide appropriate recursive expression for f ,
we need some additional notation. We define prev(Z) to be the last candidate from C ′
with respect to L that precedes the candidates from Z. That is prev(Z) is the maximal
(“rightmost”) element of C ′ ∩ before(Z) with respect to L. We define Prev(Z) to be the set
that contains prev(Z) and all the candidates from C ′ ∪ A′ that are between prev(Z) and
Z, with respect to L. For a well-formed set Z = {z1, . . . , z2k} and an element z ∈ Prev(Z)
(provided that Prev(Z) is defined) we let δ(Z, z) be 1 if in election ({z, z1, . . . , z2k}, V )
candidate zk is either p or obtains fewer than ρ points. Otherwise we set δ(Z, z) = 0. Now,
for each nonnegative integer s and each well-formed set Z = {z1, . . . , z2k} ⊆ C ′ ∪ A′ such
that z1 L · · · L z2k the following relation holds (χA′ is the characteristic function of set A′,
i.e., χA′(z) is 1 if z ∈ A′ and is 0 otherwise):
f(Z, s) =


∑
z∈Prev(Z)
δ(Z, z)f({z, z1 , . . . , z2k−1}, s − χA′(z)), if Prev(Z) is defined,
1, otherwise.
Note that if Prev(Z) is not defined then Z = BL and by single-peakedness of the election,
z1, . . . , zk have zero points each.
The correctness of this recursive expression follows by our assumptions and by
Lemma 4.7. It is easy to see that using dynamic programming and this recursive expression
we can compute f(BR, ℓ′) in polynomial time. This concludes the proof.
Voter Control. We now turn to the case of voter control and we start with the unre-
stricted case. This time, we need quite a few new ideas: Under k-Approval (for fixed k,
k ≥ 2) all types of counting voter control are hard, while the complexity of decision vari-
ants is quite varied (see the works of Lin [33, 13] and of Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and
Hemaspaandra [20]).
We start by considering 2-Approval-#CCAV and 2-Approval-#CCDV separately, then
we extend these results to k ≥ 3, and finally we invoke Theorem 3.2 to obtain the results
for the destructive cases.
Theorem 4.8. In the unrestricted case, 2-Approval-#CCAV is #P-Turing-complete and
2-Approval-#CCDV is #P-metric-complete.
8Yes, we really mean the condition on scores to apply to candidates z1, . . . , zk but not to candidates
zk+1, . . . , z2k; we will implicitly ensure that the scores of zk+1, . . . , z2k do satisfy the condition as well.
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Proof. We first consider 2-Approval-#CCAV. We give a Turing reduction from #Perfect-
Matching to 2-Approval-#CCAV. Let G = (G(X), G(Y ), G(E)) be our input bipartite
graph, where G(X) = {x1, . . . , xn} and G(Y ) = {y1, . . . , yn} are sets of vertices, and
G(E) = {e1, . . . , em} is the set of edges. We form an election E = (C, V ) and a collec-
tion W of unregistered voters as follows. We set C = {p, b1, b2} ∪G(X) ∪G(Y ) and we let
V = (v1, v2), where v1 has preference order p > b1 > C−{p, b1} and v2 has preference order
p > b2 > C−{p, b2}. We letW = (w1, . . . , wm), where for each ℓ, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m, if eℓ = {xi, yj}
then wℓ has preference order xi > yj > C − {xi, yj}.
Thus, in election E candidate p has score 2, candidates b1 and b2 have score 1, and
candidates in G(X) ∪ G(Y ) have score 0. We form an instance I of 2-Approval-#CCAV
with election E = (C, V ), collection W of unregistered voters, designated candidate p, and
the number of voters that can be added set to n. We form instance I ′ to be identical, except
we allow to add at most n− 1 voters.
It is easy to verify that the number of 2-Approval-#CCAV solutions for I (for I ′) is
the number of matchings in G of cardinality at most n (the number of matchings in G of
cardinality at most n − 1). (Each unregistered voter corresponds to an edge in G and one
cannot add two edges that share a vertex as then p would no longer be the unique winner.)
The number of perfect matchings in G is exactly the number of solutions for I minus the
number of solutions for I ′.
Let us now consider the case of 2-Approval-#CCDV. We give a metric reduction from
#PerfectMatching. As before, let G = (G(X), G(Y ), G(E)) be our input bipartite graph,
where X = {x1, . . . , xn} and Y = {y1, . . . , yn} are sets of vertices, and E = {e1, . . . , em}
is the set of edges. For each vertex v of G, we write d(v) to denote v’s degree. We set
D = max{d(v) | v ∈ X ∪ Y } and we set T =
∑
v∈X∪Y (D − d(v)). W.l.o.g. we assume that
D ≥ 2. We form an election E = (C, V ) as follows. We set C = {p} ∪X ∪ Y ∪ B, where
B = {b1, . . . , bT+D}. We form the collection V = VE +AX,Y +Ap of voters as follows:
1. We set VE = (v1, . . . , vm) and for each eℓ = {xi, yj} ∈ E, we set the preference order
of vℓ to be xi > yj > C − {xi, yj}.
2. We set AX,Y = (a1, . . . , aT ) and we set their preference orders so that for each v ∈
X ∪ Y , AX,Y contains exactly D − d(v) voters with preference orders of the form
v > bt > C − {v, bt} (see Item 4. below regarding how candidates bt are chosen).
3. We set Ap = {aT+1, . . . , aT+D}, where each voter aT+i, 1 ≤ i ≤ D, has preference
order of the form p > bt > C −{p, bt} (see Item 4. below regarding how candidates bt
are chosen).
4. We arrange the preference orders of voters in AX,Y + Ap so that each candidate bt,
1 ≤ t ≤ T +D, receives exactly 1 point.
Thus, before deleting any of the voters, each candidate in {p} ∪X ∪ Y has score D ≥ 2 and
each candidate in B has score 1. We form instance I of 2-Approval-#CCDV consisting of
E = (C, V ), designated candidate p, and with n as the limit on the number of voters we are
allowed to delete.
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We claim that the number of solutions for I is equal to the number of perfect matchings
in G. Let M ⊆ E be a perfect matching in G. We form collection V ′ = {vi | ei ∈ M}.
Clearly, ‖V ′‖ ≤ n and in election E′ = (C, V − V ′) candidate p is the unique winner (p has
D points, candidates in X ∪ Y have D − 1 points, and candidates in B have 1 point).
On the other hand, let V ′ be a subcollection of V such that ‖V ′‖ ≤ n and p is the
unique winner of election E′ = (C, V − V ′). Since p is the unique winner of E′, it must
hold that each of the 2n candidates in X ∪ Y has at most D − 1 points in E′. Thus, since
|V ′| ≤ n, it must be the case that in fact ‖V ′‖ = n and V ′ is a subcollection of VE such
that each candidate from X appears in the first position of exactly one vote in V ′ and each
candidate from Y appears in the second position of exactly one vote from V ′. As a result,
E′ = {ei | vi ∈ V
′} is a perfect matching for G.
Theorem 4.9. In the unrestricted case, for each k ≥ 3, k-Approval-#CCAV and k-
Approval-#CCDV are #P-metric-complete.
Proof. The proof for the case of #CCDV follows by applying a natural padding argument
in the reduction from the proof of Theorem 4.8. Thus we focus on the case of #CCAV.
We first give a proof for the case k = 3. We give a Turing reduction from #Per-
fectMatching to 3-Approval-#CCAV. Let G = (G(X), G(Y ), G(E)) be our input bipar-
tite graph, where G(X) = {x1, . . . , xn} and G(Y ) = {y1, . . . , yn} are sets of vertices, and
G(E) = {e1, . . . , em} is the set of edges. We form an election E = (C, V ) and a collection
W of unregistered voters as follows. We set C = {p, d} ∪ B ∪ G(X) ∪ G(Y ) (where B is a
collection of dummy candidates to be specified later) and we set V = (v1, . . . , vt), where the
preference orders of the voters in V are such that the score of p is 0, the score of d is n− 1,
the score of each candidate in G(X)∪G(Y ) is n−2, and the score of each dummy candidate
in B is either 1. We set W = (w1, . . . , wm), where for each ℓ, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m, if eℓ = {xi, yj}
then wℓ has preference order p > xi > yj > C − {p, xi, yj}.
We form an instance I of 3-Approval-#CCAV with election E = (C, V ), collection W
of unregistered voters, designated candidate p, and the number of voters that can be added
set to n.
It is easy to verify that the number of 3-Approval-#CCAV solutions for I is the number
of matchings in G of cardinality exactly n. (One has to add exactly n voters for p to defeat
d; each unregistered voter corresponds to an edge in G and one cannot add two edges that
share a vertex as then the candidate corresponding to that vertex would have score n, and
p would not be able to become the unique winner.) Thus, the number of perfect matchings
in G is exactly the number of solutions for I. Further, clearly it is possible to implement
our reduction in polynomial time.
The case for k > 3 follows by natural padding arguments and extending the dummy-
candidates set B.
Finally, we obtain the results for the destructive cases through Theorem 3.2 (we remark
that it applies to 2-Approval-#CCAV as well because Turing reductions are generalizations
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of metric reductions; for the same reason in Table 1 we report the complexity for k-Approval-
#CCAV and k-Approval-#CCDV, k ≥ 2, as “#P-Turing-complete,” even though our results
for k ≥ 3 are slightly more precise).
Corollary 4.10. In the unrestricted case, 2-Approval-#DCAV is #P-Turing-complete and
for each k, k ≥ 2, (k + 1)-Approval-#DCAV and k-Approval-#DCDV are #P-metric-
complete.
Let us now move on to the single-peaked case. Here we show polynomial-time algorithms
for all counting voter control problems under k-Approval (for fixed k). Our algorithm is
based on dynamic programming. We use the following notation in the proof below: For a
given j-element integer vector scores and integer i, 1 ≤ i ≤ j, we write scores i to denote
the i-th element of vector scores (i.e., scores = (scores1, ..., scores j)).
Theorem 4.11. For the case of single-peaked profiles, for each fixed positive integer k, k-
Approval-#CCAV, k-Approval-#CCDV, k-Approval-#DCAV and k-Approval-#DCDV are
in FP.
Proof. We give the proof for k-Approval-#CCAV. The result for k-Approval-#CCDV follows
by Theorem 3.3 and the results for the destructive cases follow by Theorem 3.2.
We are given a candidate set C, a voter collection V , a designated candidate p ∈ C, a
collection W of unregistered voters, a positive integer ℓ, and a societal axis L. We show
a polynomial time algorithm for determining the number of sets W ′, W ′ ⊆ W , where
‖W ′‖ ≤ ℓ, such that p is a k-Approval winner in election (C, V ∪W ′).
For each voter v ∈ V ∪W , we define topk(v) to be the set of k most preferred candidates
according to v. Let L˜′ be a weak linear order over voter set W ∪ V , such that v1 L˜′ v2,
v1, v2 ∈ V ∪ W , if and only if there exists a candidate c ∈ topk(v2) such that for each
c′ ∈ topk(v1) we have c
′ L c or c′ = c. Let L′ be a strict order obtained from L˜′ by breaking
the ties in an arbitrary fashion. For each voter v ∈ V ∪W let Xv = {w | w ∈ V ∪W ∧w L′ v}
be the subset of voters from V ∪W that precede voter v under L′. We let vl to be the last
voter from V under L′. For a given voter v ∈ V ∪W , integer z ∈ Z, and integer s ∈ Z, we
define g(v, z, s) to be the number of sets W˜ ⊆ Xv ∩W , where ‖W˜‖ = s, such that p is a
k-Approval winner in election (C, (Xv∩V )∪W˜ ∪{v}) and in addition the score of candidate
p in this election is exactly z. Equation (1) below gives the result that we should output on
the given input instance of k-Approval-#CCAV problem:
∑
0≤s≤ℓ

 ∑
0≤z≤‖W∪V ‖

g(vl, z, s) + ∑
w∈W
vlL
′w
g(w, z, s)



 (1)
Thus, it suffices to show how to compute g(w, z, s) for w ∈ V ∪ W and z, s ∈ Z in
polynomial time. Before we give an appropriate algorithm, we need to introduce some
additional notation.
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For each candidate c ∈ C, let rank(c) be c’s rank under L over all candidates from C (so,
for example, if C = {a, b, c} and a L b L c then rank(a) = 1, rank(b) = 2 and rank(c) = 3).
For each voter v, let rank(v) = max{rank(c) | c ∈ topk(v)}. For each v ∈ V ∪ W , let
Pv = {w | w ∈ (V ∪W )∧w L′ v∧ (∄t ∈ V )[w L′ t L′ v]}. In other words, Pv consists of the
closest voter u ∈ V that precedes v under L′, and of all the voters that are between u and
v under L′. When v is the first element from V under L′, then Pv contains all the voters
from W preceeding v under L′.
For a j-element integer vector scores and a nonnegative integer r, let cutoff(scores , r)
denote j-element vector (scores1, . . . , scoresr, 0, . . . , 0) (that is, we replace the last j − r
entries of vector scores with zeros). For each voter w ∈ V ∪W , we define approval(w) to be
the ‖C‖-dimensional 0/1 vector that for each candidate c ∈ C has 1 at position rank(c) if
and only if c ∈ topk(w). (In other words, approval(w) is the 0/1 vector that indicates which
candidates receive points from voter w.) Note that, due to single-peakedness of the election,
for each voter w, approval(w) contains exactly a single consecutive block of k ones.
We are now ready to proceed with our algorithm for computing function g. For a given
voter v ∈ V ∪W , given integers z, s ∈ Z, and a ‖C‖-dimensional integer vector scores , we
define f(v, z, s, scores) to be the number of sets W˜ ⊆ Xv ∩W such that ‖W˜‖ = s and in
election (C, (Xv ∩ V ) ∪ W˜ ∪ {v}) the following holds: (1) p scores exactly z points and (2)
each candidate c ∈ C − {p} scores no more than scores rank(c) points. For a given integer
r ∈ Z, let Γr be the vector (r, ..., r) of dimension ‖C‖. Clearly, for a given voter v ∈ V ∪W
and given integers z, s ∈ Z we have:
g(v, z, s) = f(v, z, s,Γz−1) (2)
We now show a recursive formula for f . For a given voter v ∈ V ∪W , a given vector
scores of (nonnegative) integers of dimension ‖C‖, and two integers z, s ∈ Z, we have:
f(v, z, s, scores) = f(v, z, s, cutoff(scores , rank(v))) (3)
This follows from the fact that in election (C,Xv ∪ {v}) only candidates with ranks
j ≤ rank(v) can score a point. It is easy to see that f(v, z, s, scores) = 0 when z < 0 or
scores contains at least one negative entry, because the score is always a nonnegative integer.
When s = 0 then f(v, z, s, scores) is 1 if and only if in election (C, (Xv∩V )∪{v}) candidate p
scores z points and each candidate c ∈ C scores no more than scores rank(c) points; otherwise
f(v, z, s, scores) is 0. When s > 0, we note that each election consistent with the condition
for f(v, z, s, scores) contains at least one voter w from Pv. Eq. (4) below gives formula for
f in case when s > 0; for each voter w ∈ Pv we count all the sets W˜ ⊆ Xv ∩W such that
w directly precedes v in (Xv ∩ V ) ∪ W˜ ∪ {v} under L′:
f(v, z, s, scores) =
∑
w∈Pv
f(w, z − z′, s− s′, scores − approval(w)), (4)
where (1) z′ = 1 if p ∈ topk(v) and z
′ = 0 otherwise, and (2) s′ = 1 if v ∈ W and s′ = 0
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otherwise. By combining Eq. (3) and (4) we get:
f(v, z, s, scores) =
∑
w∈Pv
f(w, z − z′, s− s′, cutoff(scores − approval(w), rank(w))). (5)
We claim that function g can be computed through Eq. (2) in polynomial time, using
standard dynamic programming techniques to compute function f . The reason is that to
compute f for the arguments as in Eq. (2) using recursive formula (5), we need to obtain f ’s
values for at most ‖C‖(‖V ‖ + ‖W‖)k+3 different arguments. This is because starting from
scores = Γz−1, the only allowed transformations of scores are given in Eq. (5) and ensure
that whenever we need to compute f , the scores vector is of the form (z − 1, z − 1, ..., z −
1, e1, e2, ..., ek, 0, 0, ..., 0), where e = (e1, e2, ..., ek) is some k-element vector of integers and
for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we have 0 ≤ ei ≤ z− 1. Clearly, there are no more than ‖C‖zk vectors
of this form. Thus, we can compute g in polynomial time and, through Eq. (1), we can solve
k-Approval-#CCAV in polynomial time.
4.3 Approval Voting and Condorcet Voting
Let us now consider Approval voting and Condorcet voting. While these two systems may
seem very different in spirit, their behavior with respect to election control is similar. Specif-
ically, in the unrestricted case, for both systems #CCAV and #CCDV are #P-complete, for
both systems it is impossible to make some candidate a winner by adding candidates, and for
both systems it is impossible to prevent someone from winning by deleting candidates. Yet,
for both systems #DCAC and #CCDC are in FP via almost identical algorithms. There is,
however, also one difference. For the single-peaked case, we were able to find polynomial-
time algorithms for voter control under Condorcet, while the results for Approval remain
elusive.
Theorem 4.12. In the unrestricted case, each of Approval-#CCAV, Approval-#CCDV,
Condorcet-#CCAV, and Condorcet-#CCDV is #P-complete. Their destructive variants
are #P-metric-complete.
Proof. Note that the results for the destructive variants will follow by Theorem 3.2 and so
we focus on constructive variants only.
For the case of Approval, #P-completeness of #CCAV and #CCDV follows from the
NP-completeness proofs for their decision variants given by Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra,
and Rothe [28]; these proofs, in effect, give parsimonious reductions from #X3C to respective
control problems and, thus, establish #P-completeness.
For the case of Condorcet, #P-completeness of #CCDV follows from the proofs of The-
orems 5.1 and 4.19 of Faliszewski et al. [22], who effectively give a parsimonious reduction
from #X3C to Condorcet-#CCDV. The case of Condorcet-#CCAV appears to not have
been considered in the literature and thus we give a direct proof (naturally, we could ob-
tain #P-Turing-completeness by noting that Theorem 3.3 gives a Turing reduction from
Condorcet-#CCDV to Condorcet-#CCAV, but #P-completeness is a stronger result). For
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the reminder of the proof we focus on Condorcet-#CCAV. The problem is clearly in #P, so
it suffices to show that it is #P-hard. We give a parsimonious reduction from #X3C.
Let (B,S) be an instance of #X3C problem, where B = {b1, . . . , b3k} and S =
{S1, . . . , Sn}. We create an election E = (C, V ), where C = B ∪ {p}. Let V consist of
k − 3 voters with preferences b1 ≻ b2 ≻ · · · ≻ b3k ≻ p. Thus, b1 is the Condorcet winner of
E, and every candidate bi ∈ B beats p in k − 3 votes.
For each set Sj ∈ S, Sj = {bj1 , bj2 , bj3}, let W contain a voter with preference order
bj1 ≻ bj2 ≻ bj3 ≻ p ≻ · · · (after p the remaining candidates are ranked in arbitrary order).
We claim that every subset W ′, W ′ ⊆ W , such that ‖W ′‖ ≤ k and that p is a Condorcet
winner of election E′ = (C, V ∪W ′) corresponds one-to-one to a k-element subfamily S ′ of
S whose elements union up to B (i.e., S ′ is an exact set cover of B).
First assume that there is a subfamily S ′ ⊆ S which is an exact set cover of B. For
each Sj ∈ S ′, we include the corresponding voter from W in W ′. Let us consider election
E′ = (C, V ∪ W ′). For each bi ∈ B we have NE′(bi, p) = NE(bi, p) + 1 = k − 2 and
NE′(p, bi) = NE(p, bi) + k − 1 = k − 1. Thus p becomes the Condorcet winner of E′.
Now assume that p is the Condorcet winner in election E′ = (C, V ∪W ′), where W ′ ⊆W
and ‖W ′‖ ≤ k. For each bi ∈ B, there can be at most one voter in W ′ that prefers bi to
p. This is so, because otherwise we would have NE′(bi, p) ≥ NE(bi, p) + 2 = k − 1, and
NE′(p, bi) ≤ NE(p, bi) + k − 2 = k − 2, and so p would lose to bi. Thus, each bi is preferred
to p by either zero or one voter from W ′. If bi is preferred by one voter from W ′, then for
p to win, p must be preferred to bi by k − 1 voters from W ′, and since some voter must be
added, it must hold that ‖W ′‖ = k.
If there are no voters in W ′ who prefer bi to p, then since each vote in W ′ has some three
candidates from B ranked ahead of p, there must be some other bi′ that is ranked above p
by more than one voter. This contradicts the requirement that for each bj ∈ B, at most one
voter in W ′ prefers bj to p. Hence, each bi is preferred to c by exactly one of the k voters in
W ′. Thus, the voters from W ′ correspond to an exact set cover of B.
For the case of single-peaked preferences, we can use dynamic programming to solve
voter control problems under Condorcet.
Theorem 4.13. For the single-peaked case, Condorcet-#CCAV, Condorcet-#CCDV,
Condorcet-#DCAV, and Condorcet-#DCDV are in FP.
Proof. We focus on Condorcet-#CCAV. The remaining cases follow by applying Theo-
rems 3.2 and 3.3.
We are given an election E = (C, V ) where C is a set of candidates and V is a set of
voters, a designated candidate p ∈ C, a collection W of unregistered voters, a nonnegative
integer k, and an order L, the societal axis, such that V and W are single-peaked with
respect to L. We show a polynomial-time algorithm for determining the number of sets W ′,
W ′ ⊆W , where ‖W ′‖ ≤ k, such that p is a Condorcet winner in election (C, V ∪W ′). Our
algorithm is based on the famous median-voter theorem.
We split C into three sets, Ca = {c | c ∈ C ∧ c L p}, Cb = {c | c ∈ C ∧ p L c} and
Cm = {p}; Ca contains the candidates that are before p on the societal axis and Cb contains
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the candidates that are after p. For each voter v, by cv we mean the candidate that v ranks
first. For each collection U of voters from V ∪W , we define Ua = {v | v ∈ U ∧ cv ∈ Ca},
Ub = {v | v ∈ U ∧ cv ∈ Cb} and Um = {v | v ∈ U ∧ cv = p}. In other words, Ua and Ub
consist of those voters from U for which the most preferred candidate is, respectively, in Ca
or Cb, and Um contains those voters from U that rank p first.
For each W ′ ⊆W , we define δ(W ′) to be 1 exactly if the following conditions hold:
1. ‖Va‖+ ‖W ′a‖ <
1
2(‖V ‖+ ‖W
′‖), and
2. ‖Vb‖+ ‖W ′b‖ <
1
2(‖V ‖+ ‖W
′‖).
Otherwise, we define δ(W ′) = 0. The following lemma is an expression of the well-known
median voter theorem (we provide the short proof for the sake of completeness).
Lemma 4.14. For each W ′ ⊆W , p is the Condorcet winner of election (C, V ∪W ′) if and
only if δ(W ′) = 1.
Proof. Assume that δ(W ′) = 1 and consider an arbitrary candidate c other than p. For the
sake of concreteness let us assume that c ∈ Ca, but a symmetric argument holds for c ∈ Cb.
Due to single-peakedness of V ∪W ′, no voter outside of Va and W ′a prefers c to p. However,
since δ(W ′) = 1, we have that ‖Va‖ + ‖W ′a‖ <
1
2 (‖V ‖ + ‖W
′‖), and so a majority of the
voters prefers p to c. Since c was chosen arbitrarily, it holds that p is a Condorcet winner.
For the other direction, assume that δ(W ′) = 0. For the sake of concreteness, let us
assume that this is because ‖Va‖+ ‖W ′a‖ ≥
1
2(‖V ‖+ ‖W‖). By this assumption, there must
be a candidate c ∈ C that directly precedes p with respect to L (that is, c L p and there is
no candidate d such that c L d L p). Due to single-peakedness of voters’ preference orders,
we have that every voter in Va ∪W ′a prefers c to p, and so p is not a Condorcet winner. A
symmetric argument holds if ‖Vb‖+ ‖W ′b‖ ≥
1
2(‖V ‖+ ‖W‖).
Thus our algorithm should output the number of sets W ′, W ′ ⊆ W , of cardinality at
most k, such that δ(W ′) = 1 holds. However, to evaluate δ(W ′) it suffices to know the
values ‖W ′a‖, ‖W
′
b‖, and ‖W
′
m‖. For each three integers ℓa, ℓb, and ℓm we define γ(ℓa, ℓb, ℓm)
to be 1 exactly if the following two conditions hold (these conditions are analogous to those
for δ):
1. ‖Va‖+ ℓa < 12(‖V ‖+ ℓa + ℓb + ℓm), and
2. ‖Vb‖+ ℓb <
1
2(‖V ‖+ ℓa + ℓb + ℓm).
Otherwise, γ(ℓa, ℓb, ℓm) = 0. It is easy to see that for each W ′ ⊆ W we have δ(W ′) =
γ(‖W ′a‖, ‖W
′
b‖, ‖W
′
m‖). Now it follows that the number of subsets W
′ ⊆ W of cardinality
at most k such that p is a Condorcet winner of election (C, V ∪W ′) is exactly:∑
ℓ=0,...,k
∑
ℓa,ℓb,ℓm∈N
ℓa+ℓb+ℓm=ℓ
γ(ℓa, ℓb, ℓm)
(
‖Wa‖
ℓa
)(
‖Wb‖
ℓb
)(
‖Wm‖
ℓm
)
.
We can evaluate this sum in polynomial-time. This completes the proof.
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For the case of candidate control, we get polynomial-time algorithms even for the unre-
stricted case.
Theorem 4.15. Approval-#CCDC, and Condorcet-#CCDC are in FP, even in the unre-
stricted case.
Proof. Let us handle the case of Approval first. Let I = (C, V, p, k) be an instance of
approval-#CCDC. The only way to ensure that p ∈ C is the unique winner is to remove
all candidates c ∈ C − {p} such that scorea(C,V )(c) ≥ score
a
(C,V )(p). Such candidates can be
found immediately. Let’s assume that there are k0 such candidates. After removing all of
them, we can also remove k − k0 or less of any remaining candidates other than p. Based
on this observation we provide the following simple algorithm.
approval-#CCDC(C, V, p, k)
1 Let k0 be the number of candidates c ∈ C − {p},
s.t. scorea(C,V )(c) ≥ score (C,V )(p).
2 return
∑k−k0
i=0
(
‖C‖−k0−1
i
)
Clearly, the algorithm is correct and runs in polynomial-time.
For the case of Condorcet voting, it suffices to note that if p is to be a winner, we have to
delete all candidates c ∈ C −{p} such that N(C,V )(p, c) ≤ N(C,V )(c, p). Thus, provided that
we let k0 be the number of candidates c ∈ C−{p} such that N(C,V )(p, c) ≤ N(C,V )(c, p), the
same algorithm as for the case of approval voting works for Condorcet voting.
Theorem 4.16. Both Approval-#DCAC and Condorcet-#DCAC are in FP.
Proof. We first consider the case of approval voting. Let I = (C,A, V, p, k) be an instance
of Approval-#DCAC, where C = {p, c1, . . . , cm−1} is the set of registered candidates, A =
{a1, . . . , am′} is the set of additional candidates, V is the set of voters, p is the designated
candidate, and k is the upper bound on the number of candidates that we can add. We will
give a polynomial-time algorithm that counts the number of up-to-k-element subsets A′ of
A such that p is not the unique winner of election (C ∪A′, V ).
Let A0 be the set of candidates in A that are approved by at least as many voters as p is.
To ensure that p is not the unique winner of the election (assuming p is the unique winner
prior to adding any candidates), it suffices to include at least one candidate from A0. Thus,
we have the following algorithm.
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Approval-#DCAC(C,A, V, p, k)
1 if p is not the unique winner of (C, V )
2 then return
∑k
i=0
(‖A‖
i
)
3 Let A0 be the set of candidates ai ∈ A,
s.t. scorea(C∪A,V )(ai) ≥ score
a
(C∪A,V )(p).
4 result := 0
5 for j := 1 to k
6 do result := result +
∑min(‖A0‖,j)
i=1
(
‖A0‖
i
)(
‖A−A0‖
j−i
)
7 return result
The loop from line 5, for every j, counts the number of ways in which we can choose
exactly j candidates from A; it can be done by first picking i of the candidates in A0 (who
beat p), and then j − i of the candidates in A−A0. It is clear that the algorithm is correct
and runs in polynomial time.
Let us now move on to the case of Condorcet voting. It is easy to see that the same
algorithm works correctly, provided that we make two changes: (a) in the first two lines,
instead of testing if p is an approval winner we need to test if p is a Condorcet winner, and
(b) we redefine the set A0 to be the set of candidates ai ∈ A such that N(C∪A,V )(p, ai) ≤
N(C∪A,V )(ai, p). To see that these two changes suffice, it is enough to note that to ensure
that p is not a Condorcet winner of the election we have to have that either p already is not
a Condorcet winner (and then we can freely add any number of candidates), or we have to
add at least one candidate from A0.
We conclude our discussion of Condorcet voting by noting that for the single-peaked
case all our results for Condorcet directly translate to all Condorcet-consistent rules. The
reason for this is that if voters’ preferences are single peaked, then there always exist weak
Condorcet winners. Whenever weak Condorcet winners exist, they are the sole winners
under Condorcet-consistent rules by definition. Since we focus on the unique-winner model,
if R is a Condorcet-consistent rule, E is a single-peaked, and c is a candidate, then c is the
unique R-winner of E if and only if c is the unique Condorcet winner of E. In effect, we
have the following corollary.
Corollary 4.17. Let R be a Condrocet-consistent rule. For the single-peaked case, R-
#CCDC, R-#DCAC, R-#CCAV, R-#CCDV, R-#DCAV, and R-#DCDV are in FP.
4.4 Maximin Voting
For the case of Maximin, we consider the unrestricted case only. Maximin is Condorcet-
consistent and, thus, for the single-peaked case we can use Corollary 4.17.
The complexity of decision variants of control for Maximin was studied by Faliszewski,
Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [19]. In particular, they showed that under Maximin
all voter control problems are NP-complete and an easy adaptation of their proofs gives the
following theorem.
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Theorem 4.18. Maximin-#CCAV and Maximin-#CCDV are #P-complete, and Maximin-
#DCAV and Maximin-#DCDV are #P-metric-complete.
On the other hand, among the candidate control problems for Maximin, only Maximin-
CCAC is NP-complete (DCAC, CCDC, and DCDC are in P). Still, this hardness of control
by adding candidates translates into the hardness of all the counting variants of candidate
control.
Theorem 4.19. Maximin-#CCAC is #P-complete and Maximin-#DCAC is #P-metric-
complete.
Proof. Faliszewski et al. [19]’s proof that Maximin-CCAC is NP-complete can be used with-
out change; their reduction from X3C to Maximin-CCAC is also correct as a parsimonious
reduction from #X3C to Maximin-#CCAC. The result for Maximin-#DCAC follow through
Theorem 3.2.
The cases of Maximin-#CCDC and Maximin-#DCDC are more complicated and require
new ideas because decision variants of these problems are in P.
Theorem 4.20. Both Maximin-#CCDC and Maximin-#DCDC are #P-Turing-complete.
Proof. We consider the #CCDC case first. Clearly, the problem belongs to #P and it re-
mains to show hardness. We will do so by giving a Turing reduction from #PerfectMatching.
Let G = (G(X), G(Y ), G(E)) be our input graph, where G(X) = {x1, . . . , xn} and
G(Y ) = {y1, . . . , yn} are sets of vertices, and E = {e1, . . . , em} is the set of edges. For each
nonnegative integer k, define g(k) to be the number of matchings in G that contain exactly
k edges (e.g., g(n) is the number of perfect matchings in G).
We define the following election E = (C, V ). We set C = G(E) ∪ S ∪ B ∪ {p}, where
S = {s0, . . . , sn} and B = {bℓi,j | 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ n, i < j, and ei and ej share a vertex}. To build
voter collection V , for each two candidates a, b ∈ C, we define v(a, b) to be a pair of voters
with preference orders a > b > C − {a, b} and
←−−−−−−−
C − {a, b} > a > b. We construct V as
follows:
1. For each si ∈ S, we add pair v(si, p).
2. For each si ∈ S, we add two pairs v(si, si+1), where i+ 1 is taken modulo n+ 1.
3. For each si ∈ S and each et ∈ E, we add two pairs v(si, et).
4. For each ei, ej ∈ E, i < j, where ei and ej share a vertex, and for each ℓ, 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ n,
we add two pairs v(ei, bℓi,j) and two pairs v(ej , b
ℓ
i,j).
Let T be the total number of pairs v(a, b), a, b ∈ C, included in V . By our construction, the
following properties hold:
1. scoremE (p) = T−1 and it is impossible to change the score of p be deleting n candidates
or fewer (this is because there are n+1 candidates si ∈ S such that NE(p, si) = T −1.
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2. For each si ∈ S, scoremE (si) = T − 2, but deleting si−1 (where we take i − 1 modulo
n+ 1) increases the score of si to T + 1.
3. For each et ∈ E, scoremE (et) is T − 2.
4. For each bℓi,j ∈ B, score
m
E (b
ℓ
i,j) = T − 2 and it remains T − 2 if we delete either ei or
ej , but it becomes T if we delete both ei and ej .
Note that p is the unique winner of E. For each k, 0 ≤ k ≤ n, we form instance I(k) =
(C, V, p, k) of Maximin-#CCDC. We define f(k) = #I(k)−#I(k− 1). That is, f(k) is the
number of solutions for I(k) where we delete exactly k candidates. We claim that for each
k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, it holds that f(k) =
∑k
j=0
(‖B‖
j
)
g(k − j). Why is this so? First, note that by
the listed-above properties of E, deleting any subset C ′ of candidates from C that contains
some member of S prevents p from being a winner. Thus, we can only delete subsets C ′ of
C that contains candidates in G(E) ∪ B. Let us fix a nonnegative integer r, 0 ≤ r ≤ n.
Let C ′ ⊆ G(E) ∪ B be such that p is the unique Maximin winner of E′ = (C − C ′, V )
and ‖C ′‖ = r. Let rB = ‖C ′ ∩ B‖ and rG(E) = ‖C
′ ∩ G(E)‖. It must be the case that
for each ei, ej ∈ G(E), i < j, where ei and ej share a vertex, C ′ contains at most one of
them. Otherwise, E′ would contain at least one of the candidates bℓi,j, 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ n, and this
candidate would have score higher than p. Thus, the candidates in C ′ ∩ G(E) correspond
to a matching in G of cardinality rG(E). On the other hand, since rB ≤ n, C ∩B contains
an arbitrary subset of B. Thus, there are exactly
(‖B‖
rB
)
g(rG(E)) such sets C
′. Our formula
for f(k) is correct.
Now, using standard algebra (a process similar to Gauss elimination), it is easy to
verify that given values f(1), f(2), . . . , f(n), it is possible to compute (in this order)
g(0), g(1), . . . , g(n). Together with the fact that constructing each I(k), 0 ≤ k ≤ n, re-
quires polynomial time with respect to the size of G, this proves that given oracle access to
Maximin-#CCDC, we can solve #PerfectMatching. Thus, Maximin-#CCDC is #P-Turing-
complete and, by Theorem 3.2, so is Maximin-#DCDC.
5 Related Work
The focus of this paper is on the complexity of predicting election winners for the case, where
we are uncertain about the structure of the election (the exact identities of candidates/voters
that participate), yet we have perfect knowledge of voters’ preference orders. However, our
model is just one of many approaches to winner prediction, which in various forms and shapes
has been studied in the literature for some years already. For example, to model imperfect
knowledge regarding voters’ preferences, Konczak and Lang [30] introduced the possible
winner problem, further studied by many other researchers (see, e.g., [53, 5, 1, 10, 54]).
In the possible winner problem, each voter is represented via a partial preference order
and we ask if there is an extension of these partial orders to total orders that ensures a
given candidate’s victory. Bachrach, Betzler, and Faliszewski [1] extended the model by
considering counting variants of possible winner problems. Namely, they asked for how
many extensions of the votes a given candidate wins, in effect obtaining the probability of
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the candidate’s victory. This is very similar to our approach, but there are also important
differences. In the work of Bachrach et al., we have full knowledge regarding the identities
of candidates and voters participating in the election, but we are uncertain about voters’
preference orders. In our setting, we have full knowledge about voters’ preference orders,
but we are uncertain about the identities of candidates/voters participating in the election.
Another model of predicting election outcomes is that of Hazon et al. [26]. They consider
a situation where each voter is undecided regarding several possible votes. That is, for each
voter we are given several possible preference orders and a probability distribution over these
votes. The question is, what is the probability that a designated candidate wins.
From a technical standpoint, our research continues the line of work on the complexity
of control. This line of work was initiated by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [3], and then con-
tinued by Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [28] (who introduced the destructive
cases), by Meir et al. [37] (who considered multiwinner rules and who generalized the idea
of the constructive and destructive cases), by Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaan-
dra [19] (who introduced multimode model of control), by Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and
Hemaspaandra [20] (who were first to consider control for weighted elections), by Rothe
and Schend [46] (who initiated the empirical study of the complexity of control problems),
and by many other researchers, who provided results for specific voting rules and who in-
troduced various other novel means of studying control problems (see, e.g., the following
papers [6, 15, 16, 34, 35, 38, 45]; we also point the readers to the survey [18]).
Single-peaked elections were studied for a long time in social choice literature, but they
gained popularity in the computational social choice world fairly recently, mostly due to
the papers of Walsh [51] and Conitzer [11]. Then, Faliszewski et al. [23] and, later, Brandt
et al. [8] studied the complexity of control problems for single-peaked elections. Recently,
Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [21] complemented this line of work by
studying nearly single-peaked profiles.
Going in a different direction, our work is very closely related to the paper of Walsh and
Xia [52] on lot-based elections. Walsh and Xia study a model of Venetian elections, where a
group of voters of a given size is randomly selected from a group of eligible voters, and the
votes are collected from these selected voters only. In this setting, the problem of computing
a candidate’s chances of victory, in essence, boils down to the counting variant of control by
adding voters problem. Thus, our paper and that of Walsh and Xia are quite similar on the
technical front. The papers, however, have no overlap in terms of results.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We have considered a model of predicting election winners in settings where there is uncer-
tainty regarding the structure of the election (that is, regarding the exact set of candidates
and the exact collection of voters participating in the election). We have shown that our
model corresponds to the counting variants of election control problems (specifically, we have
focused on election control by adding/deleting candidates and voters). We have considered
Plurality, Approval, Condorcet, k-Approval, and Maximin (see Table 1 for our results). For
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the former three, the complexity of counting variants of control is analogous to the complex-
ity of decision variants of respective problems, but for the latter two, some of the counting
control problems are more computationally demanding than their decision counterparts.
Many of our results indicate computational hardness of winner prediction problems. To
alleviate this issue to some extent, we also considered single-peaked preferences that are more
likely to appear in practice. In this case, we got polynomial-time results only (except the case
of Approval, where have no results for the single-peaked case). Still, sometimes in practice
one might have to seek heuristic algorithms or approximate solutions (e.g., sampling-based
algorithms similar to the one of Bachrach, Betzler, and Faliszewski [1, Theorem 6]).
There are many ways to extend our work. For example, in the intruduction we mentioned
the model where for each voter v (or candidate c) we have probability pv (probability pc) that
this voter (candidate) participates in the election. We believe that studying this problem
in more detail would be very interesting. As we have argued, the model where all values
pv (pc) are identical, reduces to our setting, but the cases where the probabilities can differ
remain open.
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